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Introduction. Academia, Scholarship
and the Challenge of Hindutvaism:
Making Sense of India’s
Authoritarian Turn
Aminah Mohammad-Arif and Jules Naudet
1 Academia,  science,  and freedom of  speech are under assault  in  India.  This  is  not  a
metaphor: scholars and students are being attacked in many ways, including physically.
As a journal specialized on South Asia, we consider that our core mission—producing
scientific knowledge about societies—is also being threatened. This situation prompted
the SAMAJ editorial board to bring together academics to reflect on this current state
of affairs. 
2 Our main objective is to show that the social sciences propose useful analytical tools to
understand India’s political evolution under Narendra Modi’s regime. In order to raise
awareness and help non-specialist readers understand what is currently happening in
India, we have chosen to make an exception to our usual format and open the journal
up to more than just the traditional academic article and also include essays, interviews
or portraits of significant figures.
3 For this precise reason, the first section of this introduction starts by clarifying a term
that is central to all the papers gathered here: Hindutva. The second section briefly
reviews the chronology of events from the passing of the CAA in December 2019 to the
Delhi pogroms of 2020. It also highlights how the BJP has been actively trying to crush
all  forms  of  dissent  since  2014.  The  third  section  examines  how  Modi’s  second
government, elected in 2019, has been characterized by an acceleration in the BJP’s
attempt to enforce the idea of a non-secular India. As a matter of fact, the year 2019
represents an undeniable “Hindutva turn.” The fourth section questions the nature of
the new regime, through a discussion of the notion of fascism, which is increasingly
used by commentators to qualify Hindutva. The final section presents the contributions
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4 Hindutva is a multifaceted term that simultaneously refers to an ideology, a political
movement, and an objective, that of laying the foundations of this ideology within the
Indian political system and in the minds of Indian citizens. 
5 Hindutva ideology was crafted by V.D. Savarkar and M.S. Golwalkar who promoted a
kind of Hindu ethnic and religious supremacism, based on the idea of a Hindu nation
(Hindu rashtra), a Hindu race (Hindu jati) and a Hindu civilization (Hindu sanskriti). In
order to refer to this ideology, we have chosen to use the neologism “Hindutvaism”
(which we shall return to below). In his book, We or Our Nationhood Defined, Golwakar’s
statement leaves no doubt about the core tenets of this ideology:
The  non-Hindu  people  in  Hindustan must  adopt  the  Hindu  culture  and
language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must
entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture [...
and]  may  [only]  stay  in  the  country,  wholly subordinated  to  the  Hindu
nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges -- not even citizens’ rights.
(Golwalkar 1939:55–6).
This ideology crystallized into an organization called the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh), which actually drives the political and social movement of Hindutva. Founded
in 1925,  the  RSS  has  since  then become a  tentacular  movement  with  ramifications
throughout Indian society. It began with the creation of shakhas (branches) designed to
crisscross the entire country to extend the movement’s ideological influence as widely
as  possible.  After  independence,  other  organizations  were  founded  to  broaden
Hindutva’s  sphere  of  influence  in  all  areas  of  Indian  society.  Known  as  the  Sangh
Parivar (“the family of associations”), they have now infiltrated all spheres of society,
and  have  enabled  Hindu  nationalism  to  gain  increasingly  hegemonic  power  in
India. Among this  galaxy  of  organizations  stands  a  political  offshoot,  the  Bharatiya
Janata  Party  (BJP)—formerly  Bharatiya  Jana  Sangh  (BJS),  whose  ideological  line  is
directly inspired by the RSS. The fact that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and 62 per
cent  of  his  government’s  ministers  in  2020  belong  both  to  the  RSS  and  the  BJP  is
undeniable  proof  of  the  intimate  connections  between  the  two  organizations  (HT
Editorial Board 2020).
6 The objective of this movement is indeed to institutionalize Hindutvaism by grounding
it in political and administrative spheres, as well as in social and cultural ones. We refer
to  these  efforts  to  implement  Hindutva  hegemony  as  “Hindutvaization,”  another
neologism (see below). In order to reach their objective, the various organizations of
the Sangh Parivar have structured their mobilizations around several key symbols: the
construction of a temple dedicated to the God Ram on the site of the Babri mosque in
Ayodhya, the abolition of the Article 370 of the Constitution that grants special status
to Jammu and Kashmir, the ban of cow slaughter, the criminalization of conversions
from Hinduism to another religion, etc. These key areas of conflict aim to polarize the
country and cement the Hindu community around a nationwide hatred of religious
minorities, Muslims in particular. This strategy has involved, among other tactics, the
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organization of communal riots and anti-Muslim pogroms, such as in Gujarat, in 2002,
where violence claimed an estimated 800 to 2,000 lives. 
 
Dissent, violence and Hindutva
7 The December 15 date for the publication of this special issue is not a coincidence. It
was deliberately chosen to commemorate the emblematic Shaheen Bagh protests that
began exactly one year ago, on December 15, 2019. A major case of violence against
universities also occurred that day: students of Jamia Millia University, quietly reading
in  a  library,  were  beaten  by  police  officers  without  any  warning.  The  latter  also
assaulted other students on the same campus, who had gathered to protest against the
Citizenship Amendment Act, ratified by Parliament a few days before. This law, which
changes the conditions of access to citizenship (see below and see contributions by
Kennedy1 and  Mathur 2 in  this  volume),  subsequently  triggered  a  huge  protest
movement throughout the country. The violence at Jamia Millia continued over the
following days, spreading to other universities such as Aligarh Muslim University and
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU)—where the latter had already been the target of
state violence since Hindu nationalists had won elections at the central level.  Since
then,  symbolic,  verbal,  and  physical  attacks  have  continued  against  people  from
various backgrounds who were protesting against the new law. But academics have
remained among the prime targets. One of the latest victims is a contributor to this
special issue, Jayati Ghosh, an economics professor at JNU (Mahaprashasta 2020). Along
with other colleagues, she is falsely accused of helping to foment the Delhi riots of
February 2020 that erupted during the protests against the citizenship law.
8 Attacks  on  universities  are  evidence  of  the  magnitude  of  the  threats  to  academic
production. They take the form of assaults using the media or legal measures, such as
those targeted at another contributor to this issue, Nivedita Menon, a political scientist
at JNU (John 2016). Social science researchers and professors are now being labeled as
enemies from within. Faculty members and other teachers censor themselves in their
own classrooms for fear of being denounced by students who have been won over to
the Hindutva cause. Apart from obstructing social science inquiry, there are efforts to
instrumentalize  other  fields  of  research in  order  to  advance an ideological  agenda.
Biologists, for instance, have been called upon to set up investigation protocols aimed
at demonstrating the healing powers of cow dung and urine (even against diseases like
cancer) (Chandrashekhar 2020) or the virtues of the water of the Ganges.
9 Symbolic  violence  extends  beyond  India’s  borders,  as  shown  by  the  examples  of
American researchers who have been mistreated in recent years by Hindutva militias,
like the Indologist, Wendy Doniger, the philologist, Sheldon Pollock, and the historian,
Audrey Truschke, who has contributed a piece to this volume. Since the publication of
her  work  calling  into  question  the  commonly  held  image  of  the  Mughal  Emperor,
Aurangzeb,  as  intolerant  towards  non-Muslims,  Audrey  Truschke  has  been  very
regularly subjected to violent abuse on social media (Moses 2018). For Wendy Doniger
and her publisher (Penguin Books), things have gone further: both were subject to legal
proceedings after the publication of her book, The Hindus: An Alternative History, because
her interpretation of the texts of Hinduism3 was not to the liking of Hindutva followers
(Singh 2014).  As  for  Sheldon  Pollock,  an  (unsuccessful)  campaign  was  launched  to
remove him from the direction of a book series on classical India (the Murty Classical
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Library of India), the contention being that because he is not of Indian origin, he lacks
the required knowledge to occupy a position of responsibility in that institution. The
real  reason  behind  such  a  move  was  that  he  had  added  his  voice  to  the  public
denunciation by intellectuals of the attacks against JNU academics and students (ET
Bureau 2016).
10 While these attacks on academia are of major concern, they are only part of a more
general context of violence enacted by Hindutva militias against several other groups
of individuals, among whom, in addition to public intellectuals and NGOs, journalists
and religious minorities figure prominently.
11 The  media  is  indeed  confronted  with  multifaceted  censorship,  not  unlike  that
experienced in 1975-1977, although no such State of Emergency is in effect today. This
censorship and/or self-censorship, out of political allegiance or driven by fear of being
chastised, losing one’s job, or even being the victim of physical attacks, mainly takes
place in television and mainstream newspapers, which as a result are very measured in
their  criticism of  the  government,  when they  do  not  blatantly  support  it.  Another
reason for this (self-)censorship is that most press groups are owned by large financial
consortia  that  support  the  government’s  liberal  economic  policy.  Beyond  symbolic
violence, verbal violence can stem directly from the State, as shown by the nickname
“presstitutes” assigned to independent journalists by Vijay Kumar Singh, former Chief
of  Army Staff  and twice Minister in the successive governments of  Narendra Modi.
Since then, the nickname has been taken up by Hindutva supporters (Agrawal 2015).
Independent  journalism  in  India  is  operating  in  an  increasingly  hostile  climate,
marked, moreover, in recent years by an upsurge in violence, even resulting in murder,
against journalists (The Wire 2019).
12 Violence  against  religious  minorities  targets  Muslims  more  particularly.  They  have
been victims of a growing stigmatization and marginalization since independence (see
Gayer  and  Jaffrelot  2012; and  see  Mahmudabad  in  this  volume4).  In  recent  years,
however, not only has this process escalated to the extent of being institutionalized,
but  its  degree  and  nature  have  changed  with  forced  conversions,  lynching,  and
pogroms being among the new forms of violence introduced by Hindutva supporters.
 
Modi 2 and the acceleration of Hindutvaization
13 The most recent escalation and change in violence began during Narendra Modi’s first
term (2014-2019). The first steps were taken to propel India towards what Christophe
Jaffrelot calls an “ethnic democracy,” i.e., a democracy in which Hindus and members
of other religions originating in India, like Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs, would have more
rights,  as  “sons  of  the  soil,”  than  members  of  “non-Indian  born”  religions,  like
Christians and especially Muslims (Jaffrelot 2019). 
14 This process has accelerated considerably since Modi’s re-election in 2019. As early as
July of that year, the newly appointed government took a whole series of measures,
some of which were briefly mentioned above. First, the government revoked Article 370
of  the  Constitution  that  granted  relative  autonomy  to  the  state  of  Kashmir.  This
revocation was followed by the imprisonment of most of  the local political  leaders,
including  elected  officials,  a  very  long  blackout  of  telephone  and  electronic
communication  systems,  almost  complete  media  censorship  and  the  repression  of
protests. Second, a list of 1.9 million inhabitants of the state of Assam was made public,
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including a large number of Muslims, who, having been unable to prove their Indian
nationality, are at risk of being excluded from the NRC (National Register of Citizens, to
which we shall return) and of becoming “non-citizens.” Third was the judgment of the
Indian Supreme Court, authorizing the construction in Ayodhya5 of a temple on the
ruins of the Babri Masjid (see Etter6 and Lefèvre7 in this volume).8 Last but not least,
there was the ratification of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). It amends a 1955
law to legalize the status of Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Jain, and Buddhist refugees who fled
“for religious reasons” from Afghanistan,  Pakistan or  Bangladesh before 2014.  Only
Muslims are  excluded,  even if  they  are  members  of  persecuted minority  groups  in
Pakistan such as Ahmadis9 and Hazaras. The new law also does not apply to minorities
in non-Muslim countries of South Asia, such as Sri Lanka, where Hindus and Muslims
face  persecution  from  the  Buddhist  majority.  Undeniably  discriminatory,  the  law
violates the secularist principles of the Indian Constitution by expressly excluding a
group from citizenship on the ground of religion. This is an unprecedented move in the
history of the Indian Republic.
15 While the “banalization” of ethnic nationalism during Modi’s first term was met with
relative apathy, the acceleration of the process since his re-election sparked a reaction
of a magnitude that no one had expected. The CAA in particular, that, some observers
compare to the Nuremberg laws of 1935 (Friedrich 2019, Mahmudabad 2019; see also
Mahmudabad in this volume10), led to mobilization on an unprecedented scale, which,
as said before, very quickly spread throughout the country.
16 On December 12, the day after the law was passed, students from at least 50 colleges
and universities took to the streets in protest. The demonstrations snowballed into a
massive pan-Indian movement. In addition to their massive scale, they struck outside
observers by the large presence of women (Muslim women in particular, who have not
had a  tradition  of  mass  mobilization in  India  since  independence).  Very  quickly,  a
particular neighborhood in New Delhi,  Shaheen Bagh, stood out as one of the main
emblematic  sites  of  these  mobilizations.  The  demonstrations  were  largely  peaceful,
with hundreds of thousands of people rallying to oppose the law which they believed
violated the Constitution.
17 In response to the resistance, the government chose repression, and left the field open
to individuals and/or groups determined to take on anti-CAA protesters. India’s capital
itself bore the brunt, plunging the city into a spate of violence between Hindus and
Muslims scarcely seen since the partition of India and Pakistan. At the regional level,
some states vied with each other in imagination to fight against the opponents of the
CAA. For instance, in Uttar Pradesh, pictures and names of anti-CAA demonstrators
were posted on walls, stigmatizing political opponents in an unprecedented way (The
Wire Staff 2020). The message left no room for doubt: expressing political dissent was
no longer considered a democratic right, that of freedom. In recent months, political
dissent  has  exposed  people  to  violent  reprisals,  as  shown  by  the  imprisonment  of
intellectuals and civil rights activists such as Sudha Bharadwaj,11 Anand Teltumbde,12
and Gautam Navlakha.13
18 It is in this heavily charged political context that the COVID-19 pandemic erupted. After
an initial show of unity, the world crisis triggered by the spread of the virus quickly
gave  rise  in  India  to  new  forms  of  Hindutvaization  initiated  by  the  State.  While
recommending social distancing, the Prime Minister called on Indians to bang on pots
and  plates  (in  imitation  of  the  Spanish  and  Italians),  and,  according  to  a  more
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specifically Hindu tradition, to ring bells and blow into shankhs (i.e., Vishnu’s conch).
Members  of  the  Sangh  Parivar  recommended  the  consumption  of  cow  urine  as  a
preventive measure against Covid-19 (until the urine killed someone). The pandemic
also witnessed an escalation of increasingly virulent and ostentatious Islamophobia,
using as a pretext a gathering of the Tablighi Jama‘at in Delhi,  which subsequently
became one of the first clusters in the spread of the virus. 
19 It  is  therefore  clear  that  the  pandemic  has  in  no way slowed down the  process  of
Hindutvaization of  the country.  In fact,  the health crisis,  which occurred at  a  time
when the government was harshly criticized for its mismanagement of the communal
violence in Delhi, was undoubtedly a real boon for Hindutva forces. The lockdown made
any mobilization in public impossible. It is difficult to know whether the end of the
Covid-19-related crisis, at a date that is, moreover, indeterminate, will see new protests
against the regime.
 
Is Hindutvaism a form of fascism?
20 In fact, the pandemic could be used by the government to consolidate its authoritarian
and anti-democratic turn. So much so that one wonders whether the notion of “ethnic
democracy” has not become obsolete to account for India’s political  evolution. This
question  is  all  the  more  compelling  because  the  rule  of  law  is  increasingly  being
violated.  The  Supreme  Court  decision  on  Ayodhya,  the  impunity  of  individuals
committing  communal  crimes  (such  as  the  pogroms  in  Gujarat  and  Delhi  or  the
lynching  of  Muslims  accused  of  consuming  or  transporting  beef),  as  well  as  the
appointment to the Rajya Sabha14 of the former President of the Supreme Court, Ranjan
Gogoi, known for his verdicts in favor of Modi governments I and II are all facts that
suggest the loss of the independence and autonomy of the judiciary (Bhuwania 2020).
21 If  “ethnic  democracy”  is  no  longer  an  adequate  descriptor,  then  what  is  the  most
appropriate  term to  name India’s  evolution away from secularism and increasingly
from democratic values and practices? Every election since May 2019 has shown that
Modi remains popular with the Indian electorate, yet elections are a necessary—but not
sufficient—condition  of  democracy.  India  has  been  recently  described  as  verging
towards  “electoral  autocracy”  (V-Dem  Institute 2020),  or  towards  “competitive
authoritarianism” (Mukherji 2020). We are indeed seeing in India the development of
unprecedented  forms  (since  the  State  of  Emergency)  of  authoritarianism,  which  is
combined with muscular nationalism, right-wing populism, religious fanaticism, social
illiberalism, crony capitalism, not to mention the symbolically and physically violent
othering  of  religious  minorities  (mainly  Muslims).  In  view  of  this  picture,  would
“fascism” be the appropriate term to describe India’s  political  evolution? The term
indeed seems to be gaining currency and is more and more frequently mobilized by
commentators of Indian political life (Guha 2020 and K. Thapar 2020).
22 Yet, this is a heavily loaded term that must be used with caution and that requires us to
draw upon a precise and rigorous definition. With the rise of authoritarian regimes all
across  the  world,  an  increasing  number  of  scholars  have  recently tried  to  develop
definitions  of  fascism that  are  not  reducible  to  the  sole  cases  of  Italian fascism or
German Nazism.15 Among them, Ugo Palheta (a French sociologist and political activist)
has framed a generic definition of fascism that helps to highlight striking similarities
between Hindutva and fascism. Rather than passing a judgment on whether or not a
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regime is fascist, he is more interested in identifying the fascist potential of a given
ideology or mass movement. He thus defines fascism in the following terms:
A mass movement that claims to work for the regeneration of an ‘imaginary
community’ that is considered organic [...], through ethno-racial purification
and the  annihilation  of  all  forms of  social  conflict  and protest  (political,
trade union, religious, journalistic or artistic), in other words, through the
removal  of  everything  that  seems  to  jeopardize  its  imaginary  unity  (in
particular the visible presence of ethno-racial minorities and the activism of
political opposition) (Palheta 2018:31).16
At  first  sight,  Ugo  Palheta’s  definition  seems  to  be  ticking  all  the  boxes  of  the
characteristics  of  Hindutva  as  described  above.  But  whether  or  not  to  consider
Hindutvaism as a form of fascism is hotly debated among Indian academics. For some,
like the historian Jairus Banaji and the political scientist Radhika Desai, there is little
room for doubt:  the Sangh Parivar,  both in its  ideology and methods,  is  fascist.  As
compared to the Extreme-Right in Europe, “the Sangh Parivar is in some ways a purer
version of  the  political  culture  of  a  more  traditional  fascism,”  writes  Banaji (2013).
Drawing on a number of indicators, like the influence of fascism on Hindu nationalism
from the outset (Casolari 2000), the social basis of Hindutva (middle and lower-middle
strata), the personality cult around Modi and the othering of Muslims, Desai also infers
that the Sangh Parivar is fascist. She goes on to argue that the Modi government is
fascist as well:
If the Sangh Parivar is a fascist organization, if the BJP majority government
has  assumed  office  with  capitalist  backing  more  fulsome  than  any  other
previous  Indian  government,  if  a  cult  of  personality  and  ‘decisionism’
surround Modi as no previous Indian leader, if RSS cadres have campaigned
for Modi on a scale and with a zeal that they never showed any other BJP
leader,  it  follows  that  a  fascist  government  is  in  power  in  New  Delhi
(Desai 2016:72).
However, others, like the historian Romila Thapar, are more hesitant to establish an
equivalence between Hindutva and fascism. She primarily sees Hindutva as a backlash
of the colonial discourse based on the idea of separate Hindu and Muslim identities. In
the wake of the creation of a democratic nation-state, the struggle to establish a society
of citizens with equal rights in a highly hierarchical society led to the replacement of
democracy  by  a  form  of  “internal  colonialism”  understood  here  as  a  (potentially
violent) promotion of majoritarianism to the detriment of minority groups (R. Thapar
and Kwiatkowsky 2020).
23 The question gets further complicated from an emic point of view. Of course, analogies
should not only be proposed in conformity with the actors’ self-definitions, but these
self-definitions do nonetheless deserve attention. Therefore, it can be worth pointing
out the ambivalence of the relationship of Hindutva supporters to fascism. On the one
hand, there is little doubt that the Hindutva founders’ conception of the nation heavily
borrowed from European fascism (Casolari 2000). On the other hand, like other groups
around  the  world  that  share  similar  political  conceptions,  contemporary  Hindutva
supporters will not use the term “fascism” to label their project: they are usually aware
of the negative connotations attached to the term. 
24 Both from an etic and emic perspective, the association between Hindutva and fascism
is thus contested. Beyond India, for specialists of fascism, the very notion of “fascism”
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is  ambiguous  and  fuzzy,  as  well  as  unstable  (Bertagna  and  Loriga 2020),  not  least
because it is precisely simultaneously a concept, a historical phenomenon, and a label.
In  some  ways,  there  is  only  consensus  on  the  fact  that  it  has  taken  on  a  generic
meaning to describe, or denounce and rail against, various forms of authoritarianism.
Hence, since in a way, the label “fascism” is more precise than the concept insofar as it
immediately refers to a political stigma, one may wonder whether the main heuristic
value  of  the  term  might  not  be  to  help  the  external  or  even  internal  observers
understand the dangers lurking behind India’s current evolution.
25 One could argue that, like Trumpism and Putinism, “Modi-ism” could be an alternative
and convincing analytical category. However, despite his persistent popularity among
Indians and the personality cult surrounding him, Modi’s politics are not reducible to
his  sole  person.  He  does  embody  a  particular  style  of  governance,  of  “populist”
inspiration,  but he  is  far  from  being  the  single  bearer  of  a  particular  ideology  or
movement: his politics are embedded in the larger project of Hindutva, and he would
probably not be able to remain in power for very long without the active support of the
RSS and of the Sangh Parivar. 
26 In view of the magnitude of the phenomenon, one may ultimately wonder whether the
native  term  “Hindutva”  and  the  derived  neologisms  “Hindutvaism”  and
“Hindutvaization”  (defined  at  the  beginning  of  this  introduction)  would  not  be
sufficient categories of analysis that would provide comprehensive and precise insights
into India’s current evolution. Without pretending to definitively close the debate, this
is the choice we have made for this introduction (even if several contributors to this
issue do use the term “fascism” to refer to the Hindutva movement or to the Modi
regime).  Hindutva is  indeed a  term that  encompasses  an organicist  ideological  and
political  project  and  that  has  a  powerful  meaning  of  its  own,  which  may  make  it
possible to dispense with categories and labels that are not only exogenous but often
too generic, ambiguous, heterogeneous, and unstable. Similarly, unlike “fascization,”
“Hindutvaization”  can  be  mobilized  to  describe  an  ongoing  process  (similar  to
Islamization): it refers to a more tangible reality that might enable us to account for the
evolution of both the country and the society, not only through its ideological, but also
its social and identity-related dimensions. We even take a step further by adding an
“ism” to  Hindutva—thus  “Hindutvaism”—to  account  for  a  process  of  ideologization
brought to its paroxysm (as with, for instance, “Salafism” and “Jihadism”).
27 In any case, the political changes have been so deep and massive, and occurred at such
a fast pace that observers struggle to stabilize appropriate terms to describe India’s
current political situation, and this special issue does not claim to offer any definitive
answers to these debates. Although social scientists continue to debate the appropriate
terms  to  describe  India’s  current  political  situation,  they  nonetheless  have  a  rich
toolkit at their disposal to help make sense of its dynamics. It is precisely the desire to
share  some  of  these  tools  with  a  wider  audience  that  prompted  us  to  solicit  the
contributions  published  here.  We  indeed  believe  that  the  very  rich  scholarship  on
Indian society and politics can help to take a step back and look at  the unwinding
concatenation  of  events  by  mobilizing  adequate  concepts,  appropriate  frames  and
relevant perspectives. 
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Academic perspectives on Hindutvaism and
resistance
28 True,  research  has  a  temporality  of  its  own  and  it  is  still  too  soon  to  draw  any
conclusions on where India is heading. Yet, the social sciences do have a lot to offer,
and the vast array of research accumulated on the dynamics of contemporary India
provides a solid foundation when attempting to analyze what is going on. This is why
the whole SAMAJ team mobilized its resources and energy to gather together, in less
than a year, the perspectives of different scholars speaking from different disciplines
and  mobilizing  different  methodological  and  theoretical  traditions.  As  mentioned
before,  their  contributions  are  presented  in  a  variety  of  formats  ranging  from
interviews  to  essays  and  traditional  research  articles.  We  have  divided  these
contributions into five sections.
29 The first section (“Winter 2019-2020: Awakening to India’s New Face”) discusses the
policies and events that triggered the December 2019 and January 2020 mobilizations. 
30 It starts with an essay by Nayanika Mathur on the CAA bill in which she discusses the
bureaucratic implications of the bill. She describes the project as a “paper monster”
that  seems  to  have  led  to  an  inflation  of  procedures,  rules,  and  orders.  More
specifically,  its  implementation led to “the creation of  a  bureaucratic  category of  a
doubtful citizen,” and it vested a huge discretionary power within the hands of the
local  administrations that could easily  withdraw names from the draft  of  the Local
Register  of  Indian  citizens.  Her  conclusion  is  clear:  “the  alternative  to  not  being
entered into  these  registers  is  not  just  a  social  or  a  political  death,  but  also  quite
possibly a literal one.” 
31 The second contribution is an essay by Ali Khan Mahmudabad, who explores another
source of  the outrage that sparked the massive mobilizations in Shaheen Bagh and
throughout the country: the drift from the marginalization of Indian Muslims to their
exclusion  from  the  access  to  all  kinds  of  political,  economic,  social,  and  symbolic
resources. During the five years of the Modi government, the BJP systematically barred
democratic  channels  to  Muslims,  seizing  any opportunity  to  humiliate  and exclude
them. This is why “the anti-CAA protests represented both a moment of desperation as
well  as  of  hope  because  there  was  a  realization  that  the  BJP  wanted  to  transform
citizenship from a right into a privilege.”
32 The third and last contribution to the first section consists in an interview with Niraja
Gopal  Jayal conducted  by  Stéphanie  Tawa Lama-Rewal.  Jayal  underlines  how the
assaults on academic freedom are unprecedented: data clearly shows a steep decline
from 2014 to 2020 in freedom of speech.17 Publishers are compelled to withdraw books;
lectures, seminars, films, and plays are cancelled; scholars working on areas affected by
insurgency are targeted by the police. Scholars expressing dissent are harassed; faculty
members are now often recruited on the basis  of  their ideological  preferences;  RSS
members are appointed to top positions in Central  universities.  In the worst  cases,
rationalist scholars are assassinated by Hindutva supporters. From October 2019, JNU
students  started  protesting  against  the  privatization  of  higher  education  and  their
protests ultimately merged with the anti-CAA protests, with students from Jamia Millia
and JNU doing much of the organizational groundwork of the protests.
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33 The second section (“The Ideological Tenets of Hindutvaism”) offers insights on the
ideological matrix of Hindutva by identifying its core tenets. It consists in a single but
very dense and thorough article by Dwaipayan Banerjee and Jacob Copeman in which
they  explore  the  ways  in  which  the idea  of  a  Hindu  nation  is  molded  by  specific
representations  of  blood.  They  analyze  a  highly  rich  corpus  of  textual  and
ethnographic materials as diverse as ideological texts, donation camps, the offering of
activists’  own blood to political figures, an exhibition of blood paintings of political
figures, and bloodshed during episodes of communal violence. Blood, they argue, helps
Sangh Parivar’s ideologists, leaders, and activists to pursue three main political goals:
to define the nation’s boundaries, to authorize and legitimize acts of violence and to re-
write  Indian  history.18 Banerjee  and  Copeman’s  in-depth  analysis  of  Hindutva’s
conceptions of blood leads them to frame the CAA as a punitive legal manifestation of a
long-standing claim according to which, as they very aptly summarize it: 
Ancient  inhabitants  of  India  shared  a  common  blood-tie,  only  recently
betrayed and broken by the recent conversion of some to Islam. Because of
this  shared consanguinity,  Muslims could return to  the fold,  if  only  they
were to give up their allegiance to Mecca. The implications of this Hindutva’s
knotting together of geography and blood (based on an implicit assumption
that  Muslim  blood  had  now  been  recently  contaminated  by  conversion)
reveals itself in the logic of the CAA. Because of their blood-betrayal, they
cannot  legitimately  claim  citizenship  by  default.  And  by  association,  nor
should their supporters: anti-CAA protestors were all ‘anti-national’ because
they question Hindutva’s hematological geography.
The third section (“Enforcing  Hindutvaism”) looks  at  the  practical  ways  in  which
power is exercised by those who claim to implement the Hindutva agenda: propaganda,
repression, manipulation, misappropriation of cultural and religious symbols, and so
on. 
34 In her contribution, Nivedita Menon untangles the complex threads of the controversy
surrounding the suicide of  the actor Sushant Singh Rajput.  The exploitation of  this
tragic event by Hindutva leaders testifies to their will to take control over the country’s
largest cultural industry and to “purge spaces seen as either controlled by ‘left liberals’
or as syncretic and unamenable to Hindu-Muslim polarization.” Leaders of the BJP and
the RSS have mobilized all their resources to try and achieve this goal. This episode has
also unveiled deep fault-lines within the Hindutva galaxy, and more specifically the
rival claims over Hindutva that oppose the BJP and the Shiv Sena.19 The Maratha-Kunbi-
Koli  support  base  of  the  Shiv  Sena  does  not  identify  with  the  RSS-driven  North
Brahminical values of the BJP and is opposed to vegetarianism and to “gau rakshak”
politics. Menon’s article thus contributes to deconstructing the myth of Hindutva as a
monolithic project. Rather, the Shiv Sena’s and the BJP’s conceptions of Hindutva are so
different that it led them to start a merciless political war. But whoever wins this battle
over Bollywood, the conclusion will  remain that “Hindutva is the new North of the
political compass.”
35 Jayati Ghosh’s essay asks if there is such a thing as Hindutva economics. Modi is openly
neoliberal  and  pro-big  capital,  but  his  support  of  market  fundamentalism  is
contradicted by his politics of hatred that severely disrupts economic growth. However,
the fact that the Hindutva agenda adversely affects economic activity is not necessarily
in contradiction with the core tenets of neoliberalism, Ghosh argues. As she shows, the
way Modi actively fuels beliefs that the economy is doing very well, actually serves the
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neoliberal  agenda  by  silencing  the  anger  of  the  poor  and  by  facilitating  wealth
accumulation by those who own capital. In this regard, the active and aggressive efforts
of the government to manipulate and destroy the statistical system are decisive. The
Modi government prefers to alter the perception of its policies rather than to actually
develop and implement economic policies that would benefit the people.
36 Véronique  Bouillier’s  portrait  of  Adityanath  Yogi,  Uttar  Pradesh  current  Chief
Minister, delves into the theological sources of his power. Adityanath Yogi’s rise as a
major political figure is closely tied to his affiliation with the Nath Yogi sect and, more
precisely,  with  the  monastery  of  Gorakhpur.  Since  Digvijaynath  became  its  mahant 
(chief  of  the  monastery)  in  1935,  the  monastery  has  been  characterized  by  an
increasingly  worldly  promotion  of  a  global  Hinduism,  which  transcends  sectarian
boundaries and shows strong affinities with RSS ideology. Adityanath Yogi is the heir of
a dynasty of mahants who have deeply altered the way the Naths articulate the political
and religious realms. In order to carry out their agenda, these mahants of Gorakhpur
extended  their  influence  by  taking  part  in  the  Yogi  Mahasabha  or  by  running  for
elections,  as if  the conquest of  secular power was a necessary pre-requisite for the
triumph of their religious conceptions. Heir of a dynasty of Thakurs who took control
over  one  of  the  most  prestigious  congregations  of  yogis,  Adityanath  Yogi  is
undoubtedly the one who, among the last three mahants of Gorakhpur,  pushed this
ambition of political domination the furthest by becoming Chief Minister and imposing
himself as one of the most influential national figures of radical Hinduism. He could
even be, according to some, in a position to dethrone Narendra Modi. 
37 The  fourth  section (“ Hindutva  and  Historical  Revisionism”)  further  explores  the
complex  relation  between  Hindutva  and  history,  history  being  one  of  the  major
battlefields in the Hindutva fight over cultural hegemony.
38 Audrey  Truschke’s  essay  inaugurates  this  section  by  arguing  that  Hindutva  is  an
ideology  that  relies  upon  “a  series  of  wrong  assertions,  to  varying  degrees  of
unbelievability, about the past.” One of the core tenets of their vision of India’s past is
“an imagined Hindu golden age of scientific progress interrupted by Muslim invaders
who sought  to  crush Hindu culture  and peoples.”  Not  only  does  this  contribute  to
further  stigmatizing  the  Muslim minority,  it  also  helps  to  ground the  claims  for  a
forthcoming Hindu Rashtra in a mythical golden age of Indian culture. Since the BJP
took power in 2014, this narrative has become official and permeates all the media of
cultural  dissemination:  school  textbooks,  academic  circles,  social  media,  etc.  This
construction of a fanciful past by historical revisionists is one of the major fronts in the
RSS fight over cultural hegemony. Audrey Truschke meticulously deconstructs their
tactics, which involve undermining academic institutions such as JNU or coordinating
attacks on scholars to discourage any potential dissident voice in the academic sphere.
In the face of such an assault on academic autonomy, she calls for a bolder and more
coordinated  response  from  the  academic  community:  scholars  should  not  bow  to
political pressure and take refuge in their ivory tower. Rather, following Chitralekha
Zutshi’s  call,  she  argues  that  academics  should work at  “bridging the  gap between
academic and popular history.”
39 Corinne  Lefèvre’s  article  explores  how  this  revisionist  approach  to  history  is
embedded in the heritage policies of the BJP. She first draws upon an in-depth analysis
of two national programs implemented by the BJP (the Swadesh Darshan Scheme and
the Adopt a Heritage Scheme) to show how Hindutva ideology is central to the way the
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BJP approaches the preservation of India’s historical past. She then goes on to argue
that the BJP policy does not stick to ranking historical buildings considered worthy of
preservation by the State but indulges in the ruthless creation of new heritage artifacts.
She describes how “a mania for ever taller statues celebrating Hindu historical and
mythical figures has been fast spreading across India” and how this participates in a
“Disneyization” of Hindu nationalist fervor. Finally, the darkest side of the BJP heritage
policies plays out in the form of a memoricide, resulting in the destruction of Indo-
Muslim built architecture as well as of the symbolic presence of the Mughal past, the
most obvious instances being the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya or the
renaming of roads in New Delhi.
40 Anne-Julie Etter explores the BJP politics of archeology. She starts by reminding us
that archeology is a tool that all nationalist movements tend to resort to in order to
“sustain their essentialist vision of the nation and its so-called homogenous cultural,
religious,  linguistic  or  ethnical  features.”  In  this  regard  the  Hindutva  nationalist
project is no exception, and the BJP has invested massive efforts in taking control over
archeology. Archeology indeed enables them to materialize their narratives and give
credence to their mythical reconstruction of the past. Anne-Julie Etter first shows that
since its creation in 1861 the Archeological Survey of India has been directly controlled
by the central State, which has enabled the BJP, once in power, to use it to push its
Hindutva  agenda.  She  then  analyzes  how  the  Babri  Masjid  case  has  revealed  the
political and scientific fracture lines within the world of Indian Archeology as well as
the full extent to which the State has the capacity to control scientific debates. Finally,
she gives us a few keys to decipher the complex debates surrounding the identity of the
first inhabitants of India and around the lines of continuity or discontinuity between
the  Indus  Valley  civilization,  the  Aryan  and  Dravidian  peoples,  and  the  Vedic  and
Harappan civilizations. These three lines of inquiry help to give a clear overview of the
political stakes involved in Indian archeology today.
41 The final section (“‘A Season of Dissent’: Opposition and Resistance”) of this special
issue looks at the different ways in which the CAA met with opposition and resistance.
42 The  emblematic  aspect  of  this  resistance  has  been  the  multiplication  of  spaces  of
contestation modeled upon the example of Shaheen Bagh in New Delhi. Riccardo Jaede
retraces the ways in which such mobilizations developed in Kolkata. As part of his PhD
research,  he followed a non-partisan alliance of  Muslim and non-parliamentary left
organizations mobilized against the NRC and that started in mid-2018. This allowed him
to observe how a moral community formed and unexpectedly—as the CAA suddenly
became a national issue—coalesced to constitute the core group at the origin of the sit-
in  (dharna)  that  took  place  in  Park  Circus,  a  Muslim-majority  area  in  the  heart  of
Kolkata. He then carries on with an analysis of the gender dynamics of the mobilization
as  well  as  of  the  more  general  logistics  of  the  Maidan  mobilization.  Pointing  to
antagonisms between the organizers, he further describes a turning point, when this
grassroots movement came to be taken over by the Trinamool Congress (TMC) party. In
spite of the TMC taking command over the Maidan, the initial unity of the movement
was nonetheless preserved, forcing the TMC to adjust its political stance. According to
Riccardo Jaede, “this unity was produced through the integration of different actors
with diverging strategies, goals, and modes of participating who nonetheless used the
same symbolism and partook in a shared normative imaginary.”
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43 It is precisely such resistance against CAA by state-level governments that is at the core
of Loraine Kennedy’s article. She analyzes how, following the passing of the CAA in
2019,  a  dozen  states  and  Union  Territories  as  well  as  hundreds  of  village  councils
announced their refusal to comply with the law. Given the role of state governments in
implementing national laws on the ground, this was a major setback for the central
government.  Loraine  Kennedy  argues  that  because  such  “‘institutional’  dissent  is
expressed through democratically elected bodies; it confers legitimacy on the process
and opens up space that can potentially be leveraged as a moderating counter-force.” It
also  stresses  the  capacity  of  the  federal  institutions  to  act  as “a  power  sharing
mechanism.” After offering a very clear synthesis of the major differences between the
CAA,  the  NRC and the  NPR and a  clear  presentation  of  the  legal  and bureaucratic
implications of each of these laws, she describes the various forms of resistance that
were expressed by subnational governments. Her article offers a precious map of the
chronology and the key arguments mobilized. This allows her to conclude by reflecting
on the trend towards a deepening of federalism in India as, since Independence, “the
different states have become increasingly salient as discrete political spaces.” But with
the  reinforcement  of  the  BJP  majority  and  the  government’s  constant  efforts  to
centralize  power,  this  balance  between  states  and  the  center  is  currently  being
modified. This is why the resistance to CAA by state governments must be read as an
effort they make to preserve their autonomy in a context where they are the target of
the BJP’s insatiable thirst for more power and desire to re-establish India’s early days of
one-party dominance.
44 This  special  issue  closes  on  a  poetic  note  with  a  ghazal  by  Karthika  Naïr that  is
followed by a discussion between the poetess and Laetitia Zecchini.  In her ghazal,
Karthika Naïr evokes this winter of 2019/2020 during which masses expressed their
opposition  to  the  Hindutva  project  and  their  attachment  to  secularism and  to  the
values that presided over the creation of India’s Republic. She stitches together words,
slogans, and places to portray this “season of dissent.” In the conversation with Laetitia
Zecchini that follows, she reflects upon the political power of ghazals in particular and
writing in general. She shares her feeling “that India is unfortunately right now living
proof for anybody who wants to see the chronicle of an ascension of totalitarianism…
It’s an incremental approach. First, almost always, they come for the books, the art, the
movies, the seemingly frivolous things.” But when all other cultural forms have been
taken away, as her ghazal suggests, “Poetry, once more, stands tall.” 
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3. Among other things, her book included satirical stories about Hindu Gods, criticisms of the
caste system and of the treatment of women.
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5. Ayodhya is believed to be the birthplace of Ram. 
6. https://journals.openedition.org/samaj/6926
7. https://journals.openedition.org/samaj/6728
8. The Babri  Masjid,  believed to have been erected on Ram’s  birthplace by Mughal  Emperor
Babur, was destroyed by Hindu fanatics in 1992.
9. Despite the fact that they have been declared non-Muslim in Pakistan.
10. https://journals.openedition.org/samaj/6701
11. Sudha Bharadwaj is a trade-unionist, activist, and lawyer. She has fought hundreds of cases
for contract workers in the factories of Chhattisgarh. 
12. Anand Teltumbde is a scholar and writer, fighting for Dalits’ rights. See Lardinois (2019). 
13. Gautam Navlakha is a journalist and human rights activist. He is also an editorial consultant
of Economic and Political Weekly.
14. The Rajya Sabha is the upper house of the Parliament of India. 
15. Such a trend notably follows the path opened by the “New Consensus” school developed by
Roger Griffin who contends that “like conservatism, anarchism, liberalism, or ecologism, fascism
is definable as an ideology with a specific ‘positive,’ utopian vision of the ideal state of society, a
vision which can assume a number of distinctive forms determined by local circumstances while
retaining a core matrix of axioms” (Griffin 1998:4).
16. Our translation. 
17. See also Sundar and Fazili (2020) on academic freedom in India. 
18. See Copeman and Banerjee (2019) for a more detailed account on “the political life of blood.”
19. The  Shiv  Sena  is  a  Hindutva-inspired  Marathi  political  party  founded  in  1966  by  Bal
Thackeray. 
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